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Abstract: In his paper, "Collateral Damage and the 'Incident' at Haditha," Tom Engelhardt provides a
comparative analysis of the massacres of innocent civilians in the Viet Nam and Iraqi wars. Focusing
on the events of My Lai, Haditha, Abu Ghraib, and Fallujah, Engelhardt traces the uncanny resemblance between the ways that the military attempted to contain the flow of information about these
atrocities. Engelhardt analyzes the rhetorical tropes of media coverage via the favored terms of "collateral damage" and "incident" and the preferred statistics that always claim that 99.9% of the military conducts itself professionally. The fact that the media not only accepts but also promotes such
specious terms and statistics has dire consequences for the public's ability to make sense of the
atrocities of war. Engelhardt's analysis reveals how the practice of war and the language it depends on
create a mass of unknowable enemies that are easy to kill and even easier to forget.
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Tom ENGELHARDT
Collateral Damage and the "Incident" at Haditha
First news stories about the My Lai massacre (picked up from an army publicity release), March
1968: The New York Times labeled the operation a significant success: "American troops caught a North Vietnamese force in a pincer movement on the central coastal plain yesterday, killing 128 enemy soldiers in day-long
fighting." United Press International called it an "impressive victory," and added a bit of patriotic color: "The Vietcong broke and ran for their hide-out tunnels. Six-and-a-half hours later, 'Pink Village' had become a 'Red, White
and Blue Village'";
The New York Times, November 21, 2005: "The Marine Corps said Sunday that 15 Iraqi civilians and a
Marine were killed Saturday when a roadside bomb exploded in Haditha, 140 miles northwest of Baghdad. The
bombing on Saturday in Haditha, on the Euphrates in the Sunni-dominated province of Anbar, was aimed at a convoy of American Marines and Iraqi Army soldiers, said Capt. Jeffrey S. Pool, a Marine spokesman. After the explosion, gunmen opened fire on the convoy. At least eight insurgents were killed in the firefight, the captain said"
(http://www.tompaine.com/print/the_man_from_haditha.php);
Knight Ridder, March 21, 2006: "Questions about the incident [at Ishaqi] focus on diverging U.S. military
and Iraqi police accounts of the raid, which happened around 2:30 a.m. on March 15 on a house about 60 miles
north of Baghdad. Both sides and neighbors agree that U.S. troops were involved in a firefight with a suspected
member of al-Qaida in Iraq. But the U.S. account gave the death toll as four and said the house collapsed from the
heavy fire it took during the fighting. The al-Qaida suspect was found alive in the rubble and arrested, the U.S report on the incident said. Iraqi police, however, contend that U.S. troops gathered 11 people in the house into a
single
room
and
executed
them,
before
destroying
the
house
as
they
left
the
area."
(http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/14153500.htm)

Charlie Company, which had suffered 28 casualties in its first months in the area without ever seeing
the Vietnamese enemy, was bent on revenge when, on March 16, 1968, it entered the sub-hamlet of
My Lai 4, known to the soldiers as "Pinkville," on the Battambang Peninsula in Quangnai Province.
Looking for the reputed "headquarters" of the 48th Vietcong Battalion, they found only women, children, infants, and old men, none resistant, many finishing breakfast. Almost all were slaughtered, upwards of 500 human beings.
At Haditha, we know that, in the phrase of the soldier who first reported the My Lai massacre,
"something rather dark and bloody" -- and, it seems, criminal -- happened. It started with Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, a "feral" unit, living in a "Lord of the
Flies" encampment (as described by British journalist Oliver Poole who paid it a frightening visit), on
its
third
tour
of
duty
in
Iraq
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/06/01/wbush101.xml). It had already been in some of the darkest, bloodiest, most feral fighting of the counterinsurgency war -- the
destruction of much of the city of Fallujah (http://www.tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?pid=2124) in
November 2004. After watching a company member die from a roadside bomb that November day a
year later, some of the unit's soldiers evidently massacred 24 Iraqi civilians who happened to be living
nearby in the town of 90,000 in the heartland of the Sunni insurgency. A My Lai-style cover-up followed.
Other than revealing just how overstretched the American military is in Iraq, such an "incident"
(as American officials liked to call such horrors back in the Vietnam era and still do today) is also a
kind of confession -- of failure. If, as a soldier, you feel you are protecting anyone in an area, you do
not simply slaughter random civilians, no matter how you may "snap." To commit such acts, these
Marines must have concluded in the most visceral way that there simply were no Iraqis to protect in
Haditha, perhaps in the Sunni provinces of Iraq altogether, perhaps in the whole country. You only
slaughter the helpless face-to-face when even small children have become aliens, the enemy, so
tainted by evil, by the killing of your people, that there's no hope for them. Think of it as on-theground military democracy, the grimmest sort of popular vote on whether you or the insurgents are
winning the war. It's a small enough step in such circumstances from the knowledge that the enemy
might be anywhere to the thought that the enemy is everywhere, and then to the feeling that every
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Vietnamese/Iraqi is an enemy -- or, as the slaughtered were termed in the initial military indictment
of My Lai's Lieutenant William Calley, every "Oriental human being" a "VC." Even a baby sucking at its
mother's breast might, as one My Lai defendant claimed, be helping to conceal a hidden grenade.
The process by which all human beings in a region transmogrify into the hated and feared enemy
works in reverse as well. As in the case of My Lai, the dead by some strange process can change back
into aunts, grandfathers, children, babies. It can happen on the spot. As Ryan Briones, the first Marine
from Kilo Company to speak out (though evidently not one of the killers), described the scene: "They
ranged from little babies to adult males and females. I'll never be able to get that out of my head. I
can
still
smell
the
blood.
This
left
something
in
my
head
and
heart"
(<http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2006/05/31/haditha-families.html?ref=rss>).
Such "incidents" were far more common than we care to imagine in Vietnam and are undoubtedly
more common in Iraq as well. Think of this as an endless feedback loop, the ultimate self-fulfilling
prophesy (<http://www.toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/section?Category=SRTIGERFORCE>). Scholar
Juan Cole at his Informed Comment blog speculates "that the number of Iraqis in Anbar Province who
said it was all right to attack US troops doubled to 80 percent in 2006 from 40-odd percent in January
of 2004. Doubled. And Ishaqi and Haditha and lots of similar such incidents are the reason for this
doubling" (<http://www.juancole.com/2006/06/ishaqi-massacre-emerges-in-wake-of.html>).
Just this week, the U.S. military concluded a rather hurried investigation of the "rather dark and
bloody" events in the town of Ishaqi, also in the Sunni heartland -- and despite protests from the Iraqi
government that this represented an unreasonable "rush to judgment" -- described the "incident"
(<http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/06/03/iraq.inquiries/>) in the following way: "The
[American] forces, upon arrival, began taking direct fire from the building. As the enemy fire persisted, the ground force commander appropriately reacted by incrementally escalating the use of force
from small arms fire to rotary wing aviation, and then to close air support, ultimately eliminating the
threats: "The investigating officer concluded that possibly up to nine collateral deaths resulted from
this engagement but could not determine the precise number due to collapsed walls and heavy debris.
Allegations that the troops executed a family living in this safe house, and then hid the alleged crimes
by
directing
an
air
strike,
are
absolutely
false"
(http://newsblaze.com/story/20060603075622tsop.nb/newsblaze/IRAQ0001/Iraq.html).
Note that, under challenge, the al-Qaeda member and three "terrorist" associates in the initial
Ishaqi report multiplied. There are now nine extra "collateral deaths," just as those "insurgents" in the
initial military report from Haditha, according to the Time Magazine piece that broke the story, had
already turned into civilian "collateral damage" in the first Marine probe of what happened there.
("[T]he deaths were the result of 'collateral damage' rather than malicious intent by the Marines"
(<http://www.time.com/time/world/printout/0,8816,1174649,00.html>). The Iraqi police, who identified the deaths in Ishaqi as execution-style murders beg to disagree with the American conclusions,
but let's leave aside the issue of criminal intent. What else do the "incidents" at Ishaqi, Haditha, and
My Lai have in common?
As a start, you would never have learned about them from the U.S. military. My Lai took almost a
year to make its way out of elaborate layers of cover-up via a then-unknown journalist named Seymour Hersh, and into major newspapers as well as -- in full photographic horror -- Life Magazine. Abu
Ghraib took months to make it into full digital-photo horror on Sixty Minutes II and into the New Yorker magazine, thanks again to Seymour Hersh. Haditha took almost four months to make it into Time.
(Knight Ridder -- a rarity -- reported the Iraqi and American versions of Ishaqi at once.) Imagine what
realities may lie behind all the other news reports taken from military press releases or press conferences of "insurgent" or "terrorist" deaths in places no western journalist can venture in Iraq (or Afghanistan) (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Ghraib_prison>).
The American military's mode of response to any "incident" almost invariably turns out to be a long
journey from the truth. The dead are always initially "insurgents" or "terrorists" (or "Vietcong" in the
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Vietnam era). When, for instance, you see reports of the deaths of "insurgents" in bombing attacks,
whether on urban neighborhoods in Iraq or villages in southern Afghanistan -- "Airstrike kills up to 80
Taliban, U.S. officials say" (<http://www.newschannel5.tv/News/Other/2997/>) -- there is every reason simply not to believe them, not without knowing who counted and how they identified the dead as
the enemy.
Carnage is always portrayed by the military as justified and the death of civilians, if finally admitted, invariably as "accidental" in pursuit of the enemy; hence, "collateral damage." When Iraqis or Afghans (or once upon a time, Vietnamese) claim otherwise, such claims are invariably rejected on the
spot by Pentagon spokesmen. On the face of it, the natives are never reliable or objective witnesses to
killings in their own country -- the police in Ishaqi, to give but one example, might be infiltrated by or
working with the insurgents. American reporters, once they cross certain lines, are no less unreliable.
"Time Magazine, which first began making inquiries about the [Haditha] incident in January, reported
that when one of its staff members asked [Marine spokesman Jeffrey S.] Pool about the allegations,
he accused the journalist of being duped by terrorists. 'I cannot believe you're buying any of this,' the
magazine said the officer wrote in an e-mail. 'This falls into the same category of any aqi [al-Qaeda in
Iraq]
propaganda'"
(<http://www.hkstandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?we_cat=6&art_id=19948&sid=8229886&con_type
=1&d_str=20060602>). Pool was the Marine spokesman who made the initial, fraudulent announcement about Haditha in November 2005. In fact, to the Pentagon, there is only one objective, reliable
investigator of potential U.S. military crimes to be called upon -- and that's the military itself. No genuine outside investigators can ever be brought into such a case. (Recently, the Iraqi prime minister
demanded that the U.S. turn over its "investigative files" on the Marines in Haditha, so that his people
could pursue their own investigation. Small piece of advice, Mr. Maliki: Don't hold your breath.)
Having rejected on-the-spot claims by locals and asserted that nothing out of the ordinary has
happened, should challenges nonetheless persist, official military spokesmen fall back to secondary
positions, conforming, at least minimally, to whatever embarrassing information is emerging. If the
problem threatens to settle in, an "investigation" will be announced and then allowed to fade into the
woodwork. Who, for instance, remembers the results of the investigation into the bombing of a wedding party in the village of Mukaradeeb near the Syrian border back in May 2004 which resulted in 42
deaths, including (according to those who were there) 27 in one extended family, 14 children in all?
The U.S. military claimed initially that a "suspected foreign fighter safe house" had been hit. Later,
Major General James Mathis asked: "How many people go to the middle of the desert ... to hold a
wedding 80 miles from the nearest civilization?" Baghdad military spokesman Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmit
finally admitted festivities were ongoing in this fashion: "There may have been some kind of celebration. Bad people have celebrations, too" (<http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4929336103550,00.html>).
If the "incident" or "incidents" won't go away, then not one, but multiple military investigations
ensue; the fatter their findings, the better. There have already been three on Haditha, two still underway; perhaps twelve on Abu Ghraib. The affair then drags out, growing ever more detailed and murkier until, once again, attention fades or the spotlight shifts elsewhere. Already on Haditha, we are being told by all and sundry in official positions not to "prejudge," but to wait until the Naval Criminal
Investigative Service finishes its investigation sometime this summer. This is American fairness in action -- though nobody mentions that the whole investigatory process is the equivalent of a corrupt
police department being empowered to investigate, charge, and try itself. If an incident simply won't
go away, as at Abu Ghraib, then small fry are generally indicted and, under pressure, prosecuted. (Indictments for My Lai only made it up to First Lieutenant Calley; at Abu Ghraib, a single Lieutenant
Colonel
is
finally
to
be
charged
in
military
court)
(<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/04/28/iraq/main1560925.shtml>). These are, of course,
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the
"few
bad
apples,"
as
President
Bush
termed
them
(<http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0501,hentoff,59732,6.html>).
Another similarity between the My Lai moment and today is the degree to which language is policed by those in authority in order to separate whatever atrocity is under investigation from the warfighting around it. So President Nixon was quick to call My Lai an "isolated incident," particularly when
compared to the "250,000 churches, pagodas, and temples" he claimed the Marines alone had built
"for the people of Vietnam" (just as the Bush administration cites those schools we've constructed or
repainted, and other kinds of "good news" the media supposedly refuses to report). When, back in My
Lai days, General William R. Peers, heading the official Army investigation of the killings, had a press
conference to present his findings, the Pentagon ordered him not to use the word "massacre"; only on
threat of walking out was he allowed to refer to a "tragedy of major proportions." After that, the
common term, as with Haditha today, would simply be "incident."
Back then, Army Secretary Resor claimed My Lai was "wholly unrepresentative of the manner in
which our forces conduct military operations in Vietnam," sentiments regularly seconded by the media. In the case of Haditha, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Peter Pace commented: "Clearly the individuals involved -- if they are responsible for the things they are being accused of -- have not performed
their
duty
the
way
that
99.9%
of
their
fellow
marines
have"
(<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/5032018.stm>). And that figure of 99.9% has been
repeated across the spectrum of the American high command, civilian and military. Another thenand-now similarity: Responsibility never goes far up the chain of command, since all investigators are
functionally sent down from that same chain of command. In fact, we know from My Lai that trials, if
necessary, are well-planned out with media impact in mind. After all, cases like these are, as the
Washington Post recently quoted a congressional aide saying, "a big public relations problem"
(<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/02/AR2006060201796.html>).
In the My Lai case, the military command, with many potential defendants, made every effort to avoid
the spectacle of "two dozen or more American soldiers, including generals, lined up in the dock like a
little Nuremberg." In discussions with the Justice Department, Pentagon officials emphasized that a
"mass trial" was not an option. Instead, the accused were assigned to bases across the country where
trial decisions would be made locally by each base commandant. A similar approach seems to have
been taken for the scattered Abu Ghraib prosecutions. Above all, in the damage-control phase of such
"incidents," what is being avoided is the phrase "war crimes."
Perhaps, however, what the "incidents" have in common -- and what they really tell us about the
war in Iraq (as in Vietnam long ago) -- is this: In both Haditha and Ishaqi, the dead were largely or all
civilian noncombatants: an aged amputee in a wheelchair holding a Koran, small children, grandparents, students, women, and a random taxi driver all died. These were the "collateral deaths" and what
they held in common was simply their civilian-ness, and how civilian -- and so criminal -- war itself
has
become
(<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/06/02/AR2006060201796.html>).
We need a new language for this. "Collateral damage" is, of course, a Pentagon euphemism for
unintentional or incidental destruction of property, facilities, or noncombatants that crept into our language in the Vietnam years and never left. Collateral means "of a secondary nature" or "subordinate,"
and "damage" is a description you would apply to wrecked or destroyed property, but not normally to
the human body. Who, after all, would say, as a woman lay on the ground, shot through the head,
that she had been "damaged." But there's a far deeper problem with the term. Since March 2003,
almost 2,500 American soldiers, just over 200 troops from allied forces, and several hundred private
contractors or mercenaries have died in Iraq (<http://antiwar.com/casualties/>). We have no idea
how many insurgents, Iraqi soldiers, or militia members have died in that same period, though the
number must be large indeed. But we do know one thing. In modern wars, especially those conducted
in part from the air (as both Iraq and Afghanistan have been), there's nothing "collateral" about civil-
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ian deaths. If anything, the "collateral deaths" are those of the combatants on any side. Civilian
deaths are now the central fact, the very essence of war. Not seeing that means not seeing war.
The lack of decent media coverage of the use of air power in Iraq and Afghanistan -- as in South
Vietnam -- as well as artillery, tanks, cluster bombs, and the like, helps obscure both the widespread
nature and the centrality of indiscriminate civilian death. At least we do see something of the odd brutal Haditha or My Lai or Ishaqi, when, sooner or later, it rises to the level of media attention. Killing
civilians from the air, which automatically seems to fall into the category of "collateral" or "accidental,"
and never the criminal (no matter how often civilians die from it), is actually far more destructive and
so far worse. It should, of course, be obvious that, if you are going to destroy what you believe to be
a "terrorist safe house" in the middle of an urban neighborhood, noncombatants who just happen to
be living in the environs will be "damaged" (<http://www.tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?pid=2047>).
The massacre at Haditha, which just made the covers of Time and Newsweek, is one of those singular
stories of our 24/7 moment that briefly fills the frame of the screen (and the cover), sucking up all
attention. In this way, the needs of our media, as presently organized, fit with the damage-control
efforts of the Pentagon (although Donald Rumsfeld and his associates would surely be a good deal
happier if the "incidents" at Haditha and Ishaqi had never surfaced in the first place).
If those horrific murders in Haditha become the mother of all "incidents," however, Iraq may not
make more sense, but less. So let's widen the Iraq frame and take another look. Those 24 dead noncombatants are not, in fact, an "incident" at all, nor "isolated," nor -- another of those then-and-now
terms -- an "aberration." Make no mistake, they are the essence of this war. From the beginning, the
continual slaughter of civilians, as well as the destruction of civilian property and livelihoods, has been
the modus operandi of the American invasion and occupation of Iraq. That most of it didn't happen
eyeball-to-eyeball with revenge on the brain certainly made little difference to the many victims, nor
should it make too much difference to us.
To be even more accurate, Iraqi civilians were dying long before the invasion of Iraq. Though exact numbers have been much argued about, there can be no question that the unsuccessful American
(and British) strategy of strangling Saddam Hussein's regime via severely imposed UN sanctions
caused
the
death
rates
of
Iraqi
children
to
soar
before
2003.
(<http://www.thenation.com/docprint.mhtml?i=20011203&s=cortright;
http://www.tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?pid=226>). On March 20th of that year, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld chose to begin the invasion of Iraq with a "shock and awe" campaign of American missile and air wizardry over Baghdad. He meant to shock and awe a waiting world of potential enemies
with the news that we were to be the dominatrix of all history. At the same time -- all things for all
men -- in one fell swoop the U.S. would also "decapitate" Saddam's regime in downtown Baghdad
(and elsewhere). The results: Of fifty "decapitation attacks," as the slaughter that passed for war began, not a single one killed an Iraqi leader of even the most minor sort, but scores of Baghdadi civilians died (<http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/1212-01.htm>). In just four of these attacks that Human Rights Watch was able to investigate, 42 noncombatants were killed and many
more wounded. One early missile attack was on "a civilian Baghdad restaurant where faulty U.S. intelligence suggested that Hussein might be having dinner," reports journalist Robert Parry
(<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1203/4.htm>). "As it turned out, Hussein was not there, but
the
attack
killed
14
civilians,
including
seven
children"
(<http://www.consortiumnews.com/2006/052906.html>). Not quite Haditha numbers, but close
enough; and this would set the tone in "accidental" death for the "liberation" of Iraq that was to follow. It simply never ended.
The invasion itself was largely a military slaughter (as, for anyone who remembers the Highway of
Death out of Kuwait, Gulf War I was too). Cluster bombs and depleted-uranium weaponry were left in
our wake. We took Baghdad and then let Iraqis loot the city's infrastructure without raising a finger
except to guard the Oil Ministry. American troops stood idly by while, at the National Museum and
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Baghdad's grand libraries and archives, untold national treasures burned to a crisp and art work of
every sort from the origins of humankind was stolen or destroyed. (This represented, of course, cultural death.) (<http://www.tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?pid=4710>).
Before the invasion was over, civilian journalists started dying from coalition "accidents." From
early on, checkpoints were set up, manned by jumpy, ill-trained American troops, convinced that Iraq
was indeed a land of al-Qaeda terrorists -- talk about self-fulfilling prophesies -- and Iraqi civilians
started
dying
at
them
(<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-napalestine27apr27,1,3288656.story?coll=la-headlines-nation&ctrack=1&cset=true>). Just last week at
a checkpoint in Samarra, Nahiba Husayif Jassim, pregnant, in labor, and being rushed to a hospital by
her brother, as well as her cousin Faliha Mohammed Hassan were shot and killed at such a checkpoint.
"The
U.S.
military
is
investigating..."
Each
"incident,"
another
"accident"
(<http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/05/31/iraq.main/>).
As the President prepared to land on the deck of an aircraft carrier off San Diego and declare "major combat operations ended," American soldiers occupying a school in Fallujah, fired into an angry
crowd, killing 10 to 13 people and wounding perhaps 75. Another "incident." (The Americans claimed
they had been fired upon.) Just last week, American troops in our other war in the capital of Afghanistan fired into a similarly angry crowd after an out-of-control American vehicle ploughed into cars and
killed at least one Afghan. (Typically, American spokesmen first claimed that the Americans had fired
over, not into, the crowd in Kabul; then, under the press of evidence, reversed themselves.) From
2003 to now, it's been all accidents all the time <(http://www.einnews.com/iraq/newsfeed-iraqaccidents>).
Soon enough, American troops launched extensive urban raids to root out a growing insurgency in
which doors were busted in and civilians killed. All of them unfortunate "incidents." Tens of thousands
of liberated Iraqis were soon arrested, put into squalid jails, some tortured and humiliated in especially gruesome ways; a few were murdered -- by oversight or accident. We destroyed three-quarters of
the city of Fallujah and regularly loosed our air force on the downtowns and neighborhoods of largely
Sunni cities from Ramadi to Samarra as well as the Shiite city of Najaf and Sadr City, the vast Shiite
slum in Baghdad. Sometimes these were proclaimed "targeted" strikes, with smart bombs being used
on "terrorist safe houses." Civilians who nonetheless insisted on dying did so accidentally
(<http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2006/01/22/ING9UGQ2701.DTL>).
We reconstructed the country by deconstructing it. We were unable to deliver potable water, or
significant electricity, or repair sewage systems already badly damaged by Gulf War I and the sanctions that followed. More civilians got sick, more died. We couldn't deliver jobs and tried to cut down
on Saddam-era state-delivered rations. More childhood malnutrition, more deaths. Unemployment
remained sky-high. Less money, less ability to care for families, more deaths. In the process, a raging insurgency as well as a jihadi car-bombing campaign of Zarqawi-style terrorism grew in Sunni areas, while death-squad-style torture-and-execution murders of vast numbers of Sunnis and Shiites signaled a growing civil war. This finally brings us to the 24 dead noncombatants in Haditha (and any of
the other Hadithas that haven't made it into the news). Yet more "incidents," yet more death.
The upshot of all of this is the central fact of the war: a staggering civilian death toll impossible to
calculate. Early on, a group of Iraqi academics and political activists tried to study the question of civilian casualties, consulting with hospitals, gravediggers, and morgues, and came up with the figure of
37,000
civilian
deaths
just
between
March
2003
and
October
2003
(<http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/66E32EAF-0E4E-4765-9339-594C323A777F.htm>). A careful study published in the British medical journal the Lancet in October 2004 suggested a figure of
100,000 or more civilian "excess deaths" (<http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/LAN410A.html>).
Iraq Body Count, an organization which relies largely on Western media reports of civilian casualties
for its count, now offers 38,000-42,000 as a conservative but confirmed range of noncombatant
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deaths ("civilians reported killed by military intervention in Iraq" including in "insurgent and terrorist
attacks" <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/background.php>).
But what does any of this mean when most of Iraq is beyond the view of the media, when many
deaths may never be reported at all. Louise Roug of the Los Angeles Times, for instance, reports that
this May, "1,398 bodies were brought to the central morgue [in Baghdad], according to Ministry of
Health statistics, 243 more than April." In other words, the two-month total for Baghdad's central
morgue alone was 2,553 victims of "shootings, stabbings and other violence." And note that this
doesn't include either dead Iraqi soldiers or dead civilians who were victims of explosions (including
suicide bombings)! Put another way, "since 2003, at least 30,240 bodies have been brought to the
morgue, the vast majority of them shot by gunmen who are seldom caught or prosecuted"
(<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2006/06/04/MNGBSJ89RK1.DTL>).
And
remember, that's just certain categories of death in Baghdad. Though there is no way to know the real
figures on invasion and occupation-related civilian deaths in Iraq, they are the essence of what's happened. They are both modern war and a crime. Given the history of war (and of American warfare) in
the last half of the last century, they were largely predictable. They represent neither a set of isolated
incidents, nor collateral damage, nor -- over three years later -- can they be ascribed to accident. Neither can Haditha.
Under the pressure of a strengthening Sunni insurgency which has gained some control over large
parts of al-Anbar province, the Bush administration, instead of drawing down American forces, has
just called in reinforcements -- the 1,500 troops of the 1st Armored Division, kept in reserve in Kuwait. Let me suggest that, if these troops garrison Ramadi or move on Haditha or Ishaqi or Tal Afar or
any other rebellious community, certain things are predictable -- and there will be nothing accidental
about them: More IEDs will go off under American vehicles; more Americans will die without eyeballing the enemy; more angry, frustrated, increasingly feral troops on their third, fourth, or fifth tours
of duty, with a sense that every Iraqi anywhere in sight is an enemy, will act accordingly. We already
know what will happen. More civilian bodies, more atrocities, more horrors, and Ramadi, Haditha,
Ishaqi and other such communities will not be subdued in the process. The only thing that can possibly alter this course of events isn't to send our soldiers back to morals school for Intro 101B in "core
warrior values" -- at the next Haditha, maybe they'll just send in the planes -- but to begin to end the
hapless
American
occupation
of
Iraq,
to
ratchet
the
war
down,
not
up
(<http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/06/01/military.training/>).
Our President, in March
2003, just couldn't resist opening the Pandora's Box of Iraq. Since then, from that box has emerged
every horror with which we are now familiar. Unlike in Greek myth, however, at the bottom of the box
wasn't Hope, but another H-word: Haditha.
The Bush administration ran its numbers quickly after the Haditha story broke big-time in the media -- and word of those numbers went around fast. In fact, in the last week, was there a major military or civilian Pentagon figure who didn't manage to use them? Here's a sampling:
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld: "We know that 99.9 percent of our forces conduct themselves in an exemplary manner. We also know that in conflicts things that shouldn't happen, do happen" (<http://www.house.gov/inslee/issues/iraq/index.html>); Army Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli, commander of multinational forces in Iraq: "The allegations of Haditha are troubling to all of us [but] out
of those 150,000 soldiers, I'd dare to say that 99.9 percent of them are doing the right thing"
(<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/01/AR2006060101808.html>);
Army Brig Gen. Donald Campbell, chief of staff for Multi-National Corps-Iraq: "While the bulk of
our forces, 99.9 percent, serve with honor, there are a small number of individuals who sometimes
choose
the
wrong
path"
(<http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=36736&archive=true>).
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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen Peter Pace: "Clearly the individuals involved -- if they are
responsible for the things they are being accused of -- have not performed their duty the way that
99.9% of their fellow marines have" (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/5032018.stm>).
Marine Commandant Gen. Michael Hagee: "Regardless of the outcome of these investigations,
99.9 percent of the servicemen and service women are doing what we expect them to do"
(<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/06/04/iraq/main1680094.shtml>).
MNFI (Multinational Forces) spokesman in Iraq: "Defended the record of the US-led troops in Iraq,
saying that '99.9 per cent of all men and women' in the forces adhere to the highest standards and
any
violations
will
be
punished"
(<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/1f0212a6-f1bc-11da-940b0000779e2340,dwp_uuid=c1a5b968-e1ed-11d7-81c6-0820abe49a01.html>).
Okay, but that's where they all stop. Now, let's do the rest of the math for them. If Rumsfeld and others are right, then only .1% of American forces in Iraq have not conducted themselves in "an exemplary manner," did not do "the right thing," serve "with honor," or "adhere to the highest standards."
Let's assume, despite Lt. Gen. Chiarelli's figure above, that there are actually about 135,000 American
troops in Iraq at the moment. That means that only 135 of them are not doing "the right thing," etc. If
it's only the Marines, who make up less than one-quarter of our troops in Iraq, the figure is obviously
far lower. It seems the military won't need to invest in many teachers for that "core warrior values"
retraining of theirs, given such numbers.
"The Marine Corps issued a directive to its generals telling them not to discuss details of the
Haditha case because such comments could compromise 'the integrity of the investigative and legal
processes'" (<http://www.prospect.org/horsesmouth/2006/06/post_53.html>).
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen Peter Pace: "I understand it's going to be a couple of
more weeks before those investigations are complete and we should not prejudge the outcome"
(<http://www.jcs.mil/chairman/speeches/060529interview_CNNAmericanMorning.html>).
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld: "We don't know what -- quite what happened there [at
Haditha] yet, and it strikes me that it's appropriate to get the facts and see what took place. We in the
United States hold our forces to a very, very high standard, and it's proper that we should. And General Hagee is out meeting with the Marines and talking to them about this subject. And I don't know
that I could add anything else. Furthermore, it's not proper for me to discuss these types of things
since I'm in the chain of command, and there is a legal phrase called 'command influence,' which if I
say something by mistake, it could adversely affect the outcome of a trial, for example, in one way or
another, either favorably to a defendant or unfavorably to a defendant. And I wouldn't want to be involved in anything like that, so I am not going to get beyond what I've suggested"
(<http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,99154,00.html>).
White House spokesman Tony Snow: "Because the Marines are actually conducting an inquiry and
it's a very vigorous one. I would ask you to suspend any judgment about what happens. I mentioned
this morning that there are two tracks. Number one is what happened with the reporting of the incident, and what happened. And the Marines are taking both of those very seriously and they're proceeding very aggressively. So I think rather than trying to prejudge it -- the second thing, and this is
equally important, is that when you have an ongoing criminal proceeding, to try to characterize it on
my part or anybody within the chain of command within the Department of Defense could very well
prejudice and injure any attempts to engage in a prosecution should it be necessary. So you've got to
be
very
careful
about
how
you
do
this"
(<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060531-4.html>).
Baker Spring, a military expert at the Heritage Foundation: "If soldiers [or Marines] are acting inconsistently with these requirements, there's no doubt the military will take disciplinary actions. It's
always
wrong
to
prejudge
the
outcome
of
this
procedure"
(<http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,99154,00.html>).
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This sampling of restatements of essential American fairness in the face of a judicial process
should actually be amended for the sake of accuracy to read in the following way: When any "incident"
is first reported, American military spokespeople should always immediately prejudge the outcome by
denying in the strongest possible terms that any account other than the military one is in any way accurate. The fallback position, once that "incident" won't go away, is that judgment should be suspended and no prejudging should go on until, hopefully, it fades from sight.
George Bush wanted to be "commander-in-chief" and, with the help of his Vice President and fervent followers, to create a commander-in-chief presidency. Now he has something approaching that
and, it seems, he wants out of the mix: "Q: Have you gotten updates on the [Haditha] situation? THE
PRESIDENT: Well, I'm not involved with the investigation, and you shouldn't expect me to be. I expect
this investigation to be conducted independent of the White House, with a full and thorough investigation" (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060601-1.html>).
Note: The above essay was first published Tom Engelhardt, "Collateral Damage: The 'Incident' at Haditha," in
tomdispatch.com (6 June 2006); republished by permission of the author.
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